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ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION: COMPETITION
IN AIR TRANSPORTATION AND THE
AVIATION ACT OF 1975*
MICHAEL

E. LEVINE*

In a world of half-measures, complicated compromises, and political "realities" created by fervent repetition of untruths, the proposed
Aviation Act of 1975 may represent as much progress (or more)
as can be achieved in dissolving the costly cryptocartel embodied in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. But the proposed
act demonstrates once more the historical fact that once the government intervenes in markets to serve producer interests at consumer
expense, these interventions become almost impossible to eradicate.
To understand and evaluate the Ford Administration proposal, it
may help first to imagine briefly the legislation as it would look if it
reflected only the current state of knowledge about air transport
regulation and remained unsullied by the necessity to accommodate
a political process in which existing air carriers are considerably
better represented than their customers or potential competitors.
We can then lay this template against the proposed act and assess
its strengths and shortfalls for some particular technical diffculties
in the legislation as introduced' last fall.
An extraterrestrial visitor looking at the problem of airline regulation in America would almost certainly be confused. He would
find that air transport in America, as in most of the rest of the
world, is a very heavily regulated industry. He would discover that
regulation had inexorably increased in stringency since 1934, both

in terms of types of transportation covered (first mail, then scheduled passenger and cargo, then unscheduled service and military
* Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Social Change in the Technological
Society, California Institute of Technology and Professor of Law, University of

Southern California Law Center.
IS. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Introduced October 22, 1975). The bill has
been reproduced in its entirety in this issue, beginning at page 581.
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charters) and as to jurisdictional reach (California did not control
entry for intrastate services until 1965). From this, our observer
would no doubt conclude that a powerful rationale and a long history of efficient operation justified these institutional arrangements.
However, if our visitor then sought to learn for himself this theory and history and headed for the library to do so, he might well
be bemused to find that an intensifying barrage of academic criticism has accompanied the growth of domestic airline regulation
from its infancy and that answering fire from disinterested quarters has long since ceased to be heard.! He might initially be inclined to dismiss these academics as impractical theorists. An examination of this literature, however, would disclose that while it
was necessarily theoretical at first, since 1962 an impressive body
of empirical work has buttressed conclusions that airline regulation was both unnecessary and costly. Our observer might also
infer support for the conclusion that airline regulation was of principal benefit to those participating in the process from the fact
that virtually all recent defenses of the institution have come from
certificated airlines, their trade associations, and the Civil Aeronautics Board. Indeed, even a special CAB staff, freed of the necessity to defend its Congressional mandate or the Board's past
and present policies, was unable to find a convincing case for entry
and rate regulation.'
2 The principal efforts in defense of entry and price regulation are F.W. GILL

& G.L.

BATES, AIRLINE COMPETITION

(1949); Bluestone, The Problem of Com-

petion Among Domestic Trunk Carriers,Part 1, 20 J. AIR L. & COM. 379, Part
11, 21 J. AIR L. & CoM. 50 (1954); P.W. CHERINGTON, AIRLINE PRICE POLICY

(1958); S.B. RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION
(1961), and WHEATCROFT, AIR TRANSPORT POLICY (1964). Lucille Keyes' pioneering work, especially FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION
(1951), and virtually all the academic literature since R.E. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT
AND ITS REGULATORS (1962) have attacked both the theoretical and empirical
bases for advocating economic regulation of air transportation. See, e.g., Levine,
Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportationand National Regulatory
Policy, 74 YALE L. J. 1416 (1965); W.A. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA (1970); Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market Performance, 3 BELL J. OF
ECON. AND MANAGEMENT SCI. 399 (1972); G.W. DOUGLAS & J.C. MILLER III,
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT (1974).
'E.g., R.E. CAVES, G.W. DOUGLAS & J.C. MILLER III, W.A. JORDAN,
KEELER, Levine

supra note 2; U.S.

T.E.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, TRAFFIC, FARES

AND COMPETITION, LOS ANGELES- SAN FRANCISCO AIR TRAVEL CORRIDOR (1965);
U.S. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REPORT OF THE C.A.B. SPECIAL STAFF ON REGULATORY REFORM

" REGULATORY

(1975) [hereinafter cited as
REFORM, esp. 291-307.

REGULATORY REFORM].
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What the literature demonstrates is that air transportation regulation in the United States has produced:
1) High fares, by one estimate thirty to fifty-six percent higher
than would prevail without regulation.
2) Excess capacity, with aircraft operated using only two-thirds
of their designed seating capacity and with only half of those seats
occupied.' This excess capacity lowers labor productivity, wastes
resources, and greatly increases the fuel burned per revenue passenger mile.
3) A limited range of service options, requiring passengers to
pay for more frequent service in roomier seats at lower occupancy levels than many would prefer, given a choice; a higher level
of service amenity than many passengers would pay for; less lowfare off-peak service than would be offered in an unregulated market, resulting in less efficient equipment use patterns and therefore in a higher cost to consumers of any given aggregate quantity of air transportation; less use of low-congestion satellite airports; and fewer experiments with no-reservation service and other
options that sacrifice passenger convenience for minimum possible
cost.
4) Suppression of new fare and service combinations that might
be offered by firms not at present offering scheduled interstate serv5 Testimony of T.E. Keeler in the Hearings on the Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
at 1304 (1975). [hereinafter cited as C.A.B. Hearings]. See also T.E. KEELER,
supra note 2 at 416-17.
6 Keeler's figures are quite conservative in that they do not allow for the innovative effects of new entry, nor do they take into account the lower indirect costs
per passenger possible on long hauls. As an example, Keeler calculates a New
York-Los Angeles fare of $126.70, compared to the then-existing fare of $173.15.

C.A.B. Hearings at Table 4. He allows for the effect of possible higher load fac-

tors on long-haul flights by adjusting this fare downward to $114.30. Id. But
World Airways has applied to fly this route for $89.00.
7The passenger load factor for domestic certificated carriers was 52.9% for
the year ended August 31, 1975. U.S. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AIR CARRIER
TRAFFIC STATISTICs, at 4 (August, 1975). Typical seating configurations for some
commonly used widebody aircraft, with maximum certificated capacity following
in parentheses are: B-747, 362 (500); DC-10, 240 (380, 330 at equivalent seat
pitch to the B-747 500-seat interior); L-1011, 250 (400, 330 at B-747 500-seat
pitch). Data derived from Operating and Cost Data 747, DC-10, and L-1O11Second Quarter, 1975, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 22, 1975,
at 36-37, and LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA CO., COMPARATIVE WIDE-BODY AIRPLANE
CHARACTERISTICS (1974).
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ice. No new domestic trunkline has been certificated since the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, yet the most significant
fare and service innovations since the passage of that Act-coach
service and irregular (charter) service at 100% load factors
-were pioneered by carriers other than domestic trunklines.
5) Larger air carriers than are necessary from an efficiency
standpoint. Academics and CAB' studies suggest that airline costs
are independent of scale over a wide range of output, and crude
data" and some industry opinion" suggest that medium-sized carriers may even have an advantage over the largest carriers currently certificated.
The principal benefits received in return for these costs are:
1) Greater schedule frequency than would prevail in many markets without regulation, at least over the near term;"2 and
2) Minor service benefits to some smaller cities.'"
Virtually all disinterested analysts have concluded that these
benefits are not worth what they cost. Estimates of the annual cost
of air transport regulation to the traveling public range from a very
conservative and probably erroneous $366-$538 million for 1969"
to a more reasonable but still conservative $1.0-$2.0 billion for
1972." If one allowed for the possibility of managerial innovation
R.E. CAVES, supra note 2 at 56-64.
REGULATORY REFORM, 102-07.
" U.S. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, INTERIM

FINANCIAL REPORT at

4 (Sept.,

1975).

" C.A.B. Hearings at 1233 (Testimony of Thomas D. Finney, Jr., Counsel,
Continental Airlines).
1'G.W. DOUGLAS & J.C. MILLER III, supra note 2, at 83-96.

"But most such service is now directly subsidized or supplied by unregulated
Part 298 carriers. REGULATORY REFORM,

195-203. The principal added service

benefit to small or medium-sized communities as a result of regulation is probably
increased non-stop service bypassing large hubs, made possible by uniformly high,
distance-based regulated fares. Under competition, fares between large hubs would
probably be low enough to attract connecting passengers from nearby smaller
cities. If enough passengers preferred the less-dense, more direct service to pay
the higher costs associated with it, it would be provided.
14G.W. DOUGLAS & J.C. MILLER III, supra note 2 at 172.
15T.E. Keeler, Airline Regulation Revisited, 1976 (unpublished manuscript).
Even this estimate is conservative, in that it uses an elasticity coefficient of -1.2
in estimating welfare losses. While this may be a useful estimate for the response
to relatively small price changes, evidence suggests that the response to larger
price changes is probably much greater, probably larger than -2. C.A.B. Hearings
at 1245. In addition, Keeler's model still does not fully allow for reductions in
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from new entry and attempted to calculate the lost benefits to individuals priced out of the air travel market by present high fares,
the figure would undoubtedly be even higher.
While there is no point in retelling already well-known stories,"6
the histories of the Los Angeles-San Francisco and Texas intrastate markets provide convincing evidence of the costs of regulation. Those markets are intrastate, and the CAB lacks the power to
suppress entry into them by new carriers.' They are also provided
with lower-cost, more flexibly priced air service than are CABregulated markets. In fact, service in these markets is provided at
fares which in many cases are less than half the CAB-formula
fare.1" Somewhat less well known is the fact that the only major
long-haul market which has received nonstop service from a nongrandfather"6 carrier, New York-San Juan, Puerto Rico, also experienced a dramatic fare reduction." And the intense price competition in these markets has produced a relatively simple fare structure primarily differentiated by traffic peaking characteristics, rather
than a bewildering structure designed to keep basic fare levels high
while using promotional fares with complex and inconvenient restrictions to attract passengers who will not travel at the high basic
rates.
Another important piece of evidence concerning possible rate
levels in an unregulated environment can be found in the history
of the large irregular air carriers, who provided transcontinental
service at fares well below CAB rates until they were finally prohibited from offering individually-ticketed service by the Board
and the Congress." Competition from these carriers was almost
indirect costs through management innovations by new entrants and thus still
does not predict the World Airways transcontinental fare. CI. supra note 6.
"Levine, W. JORDAN, U.S. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, supra note 3. C.A.B.
Hearings at 1242-60 (Testimony of M. Lamar Muse, President, Southwest Airlines).
" Levine, supra note 2 at 1430. For an extended discussion of the legal implications of the interstate-intrastate distinction, see Means & Chasnoff, State
Regulation of Air Transportation: The Texas Aeronautics Committee, 53 TEXAS

L. REV. 653 (1975).
"See, e.g., OFFICIAL

AIRLINE GUIDE,

Feb. 1, 1976, at 483, 793.

"A "grandfather" carrier is one of the carriers originally certificated under the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 by virtue of its then-existing operations.

"0Levine, supra note 2 at 1426, n.29. See also REGULATORY REFORM at 51, n.l.
" Large Irregular Carrier Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 224 (1959), and 76 Stat.
143 (1963).
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certainly an important factor in the adoption of transcontinental
coach fares by Board-certificated carriers."
While the Board certificated carriers 2 and the Board itself'
would obviously differ in the conclusions they might draw from the
analytical and evidentiary record on air transport regulation, our
extraterrestrial observer might well come to the conclusion that the
record overwhelmingly proves that economic regulation of the type
embodied in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is totally unjustified.
Given this conclusion, and carte blanche to modify the statute (we
may perhaps presume that our extraterrestrial observer has been asked to make policy recommendations to his own hyperrational legislature), what changes in the Act would our observer suggest?
The general outlines are clear: CAB regulatory jurisdiction over
interstate and overseas air transportation should simply be abolished, with the exception that a specialized antitrust jurisdiction
concurrent with that of the Justice Department and Federal Trade
Commission could be retained. 2 Regulation of foreign air transportation, a contracting function for subsidized air transportation,
and a statistical service would also remain. Foreign air transportation must continue to be regulated only because the pervasive involvement of other governments in the economic activities of international carriers creates a need for coordinated strategic behavior to deal with their efforts. Contracting for subsidized services would replace certificated local service, Hawaiian, and Alaskan carriers, and whatever cross-subsidy is still provided by trunklines. Although statistical reporting is not without its costs, the
statistical base provided by the reporting requirements of the Act
has made the analysis that supports these recommendations possible, and on the supposition that future public policy analysis or antitrust inquiries will find a well-developed data base similarly indispensible, required reporting should be retained. In sum, the Board
should have no economic power over any domestic carrier able to
212

See Transcontinental Coach-Type Service Case, 14 C.A.B. 720 (1951).

See, e.g., C.A.B. Hearings at 99-140 (Testimony of Dr. George James, Air
Transport Association of America), at 512-23 (Testimony of Mr. Malin, American Airlines), at 556-60, 629-36 (Testimony of Mr. DeVoursney, United Air
Lines).
2See,
e.g., C.A.B. Hearings at 498-503, 660-63 (Testimony of Mr. O'Melia,
Acting Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board).
See text following note 32 infra.
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get an operating certificate from the FAA (whose safety jurisdiction is not in issue here) and willing to operate in conformity to
the reporting requirements and the antitrust laws.
More specifically, these amendments, deletions, and additions
to the 1958 Act which the extraterrestrial observer would suggest
might resemble the following:
§ 102 (policy statement) as it exists would be deleted. It would
be replaced by a statement of purposes limited to:
a) the maintenance of open and competitive market where
air service could be self-supporting;
b) the provision of subsidized air service procured through
competitive bidding when required by isolation or other extraordinary circumstances creating a compelling public need;
c) the provision of air service responsive to the needs of the
public and adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign
commerce of the United States, including postal and foreign
policy considerations, but with particular emphasis on the provision of a variety of efficient service, including low-cost service;
d) the collection and dissemination of sufficient data to accomplish purposes a) through c) and to provide adequate information to permit evaluation of the performance of the nation's air transportation system.
§ 401 (certification) would be deleted.
§ 402 would be replaced by a provision requiring a certificate
(or permit) for any U.S. (or foreign) carrier wishing to provide
service between the U.S. and a foreign state that required U.S. carriers to be certificated, licensed, or designated to serve it, or which
discriminated in the provision of navigation or terminal services
between its own carriers and U.S. carriers. All such certificates and
permits would require the approval of the President. Air transportation between the U.S. and any foreign state that did not restrict
access by U.S. carriers could be provided by U.S. carriers or carriers of the destination state without a certificate or permit. These
provisions would provide an incentive to other nations to adopt a
less restrictive regime for international air service by allowing their
carriers unrestricted access to all but Fifth Freedom traffic. This
"Fifth Freedom" traffic is traffic moving between two states, neither of which
is the home country of the carrier.
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would include access to Sixth Freedom27 traffic, but would preclude
undue exploitation of traffic rights by unimportant destination
states (thus limiting U.S. ability to deal with major transportation
states) or the use of "flags of convenience" to provide unlimited
Fifth Freedom service.
§ 403 (requiring adherence to published tariffs filed with the
Board) would remain unmodified as to foreign transportation requiring a certificate or permit under § 402. For other air transportation, carriers would be required to publish and file tariffs showing fares at which they would be required to provide transportation, but deviations downward from these tariffs would be permitted. All advertised fares would have to be filed as part of the
carrier's tariff. The purpose of these provisions is to prevent tariffs
from serving their historic function as cartel-enforcement devices,
but to preserve their value as consumer information. Downward
movements in fares would be facilitated by encouraging erosion
through discounting, while price-gouging of the uninformed would
be made difficult.
§ 404 (duty to provide service and connections, prohibition of
discrimination) would be amended to apply only to carriers required to have a certificate or permit under § 402. For all other
air carriers holding themselves out to the public as common carriers, there would be substituted a duty to provide common carrier
service at rates no higher than those contained in their tariffs. This
would preserve the public's right to use common carriers but
eliminate any impediments to variations in fares based on route
density, airport used, services provided, time of day, or promotional efforts.
§ 405 (transportation of mail) would be supplanted by legislation empowering the Postal Service to contract with any person
for the carriage of domestic or overseas mail by air. Foreign mail
to destinations for which no § 402 certificate or permit was needed
would be subject to existing foreign postal arrangements per
§ 405 (e). Mail to and from foreign destinations for which a
§ 402 certificate or permit was required would be subject to the
existing provisions of § 405. Provisions of § 405 inconsistent with
27 "Sixth Freedom" traffic is traffic moving between two states, neither of which
is the home country of the carrier, which moves via the home country as an intermediate point.
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the abolition of certificates for domestic and overseas transportation would be repealed. The contract provisions would restore competition to the provision of domestic airmail service which has arguably been missing since 1930, and satisfy a long-standing request
of the Postal Service. It would end the vestigial relationship by
which the Board extracts above-cost rates from the Postal Service
to aid air carriers."
§ 406 (fixing of mail rates) would apply only to foreign mail.
§ 407 (statistical reports and disclosure of ownership interests)
would be retained for informational and antitrust purposes.
§ 408 (consolidation, merger, and acquisition of control) would
be deleted. Anticompetitive combinations would be subject to the
antitrust laws as they apply to industry in general.
§ 409 (interlocking ownership and management relationships)
would be deleted. Relationships which threatened competition
would be subject to the antitrust laws. § 409 is a product of the
1934 Senate investigation which uncovered a web of seemingly
unhealthy relationships among the carriers, between the carriers and
President Hoover's postmaster general, and between the infant airframe industry and the infant airline industry." However justified
special fears about such relationships might have been in the context of the industry as it existed in 1934, relationships between
aeronautical firms in the industry of the present can be adequately
handled through the antitrust laws.
§ 410 (approval of applications pursuant to a special loan program for local service carriers) would be repealed, since feeder
service would be provided by open markets and adequate capital
funds appear to be available to carriers now operating in that environment. Where subsidized service was purchased by contract,
bidders would arrange their capital financing in the same manner
as other suppliers of services to the government. The Government
Guaranty of Equipment Loans Acte would be repealed.
§§ 411-414 (Antitrust and Antitrust Exemption provisions).
These provisions would be replaced by an antitrust enforcement
28See a forthcoming article, Levine, Regulating Airmail Transportation,J. LAw
& ECON. (Oct. 1975).
19 See SENATE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION ON AIR MAIL AND OCEAN MAIL CONTRACTS, S. REP. No. 254, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
2071 Stat. 629 (1957), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970).
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scheme for the air transport industry. The substantive provisions
would subject the industry to the Sherman and Clayton Acts' and
to the unfair competition and deceptive practices prohibitions of §
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." The enforcing agency
could be the Board, sharing concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission," or a
special section could be set up in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to oversee aviation. As long as concurrent jurisdiction allowed the other agencies to remedy any laxness on the
part of the Board, it would be useful to retain a specialized body
with jurisdiction to enforce all the antitrust laws as they apply to
air transportation. Thus the antitrust sections of the new act should
explicitly confirm the applicability of the Sherman, Clayton and
FTC Acts to the aviation industry, explicitly confer concurrent jurisdiction, and perhaps explicitly prohibit as per se violations of the
antitrust laws capacity reduction agreements, pooling agreements,
and rate-fixing agreements.
§ 415 (empowering the Board to obtain information from air
carriers) should be retained to enable the Board to carry out its antitrust and statistical functions.
§ 416 (b) (authority to exempt carriers from certification requirements) would be retained for use in foreign air transportation.
§ 417 (special operating authorizations) would be repealed,
since the repeal of domestic certification would make it moot.
§ 1002 (d), (e), (g), (h), (i) (power to prescribe rates and
establish through service) would be retained only for foreign air
transportation to or between foreign states that regulated rates
charged by U.S. carriers. Like the proposed § 402, this provision
would provide an incentive for a foreign state to allow unrestricted
rate competition on services involving that state and U.S. carriers.
§ 1003 (joint CAB-ICC ratemaking power) would be repealed
as to domestic services.
Finally, a section would be added to the Act empowering the
3- 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 12-27 (1970).
3216 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).

"1This would require an amendment to § 5(a) (6) of the Federal Trade Commission Act deleting the language excepting air carriers subject to the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 from the Commission's jurisdiction.
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Board to determine the need for and to contract with air carriers to
provide subsidized service in markets where isolation or other compelling public need were found to require it. Arrangements along
these general lines have been proposed by several analysts." The
standard proposed here to justify such service is fairly restrictive,
due in part to a CAB staff study' which determined that unsubsidized service will generally be provided in markets that generate
more than twenty-five passengers per day. This suggests that there
should be relatively few instances in which subsidy is both necessary and justified. The advantages of the contract proposal have
been extensively discussed elsewhere by its inventors. In essence,
the advantages are that the need for subsidy can be precisely determined for each individual case, costs can be made explicit and
minimized by competitive bidding, and the mechanism for subsidy
is not dependent on the willingness or ability of any particular certificated carrier to serve the points involved. The proposal also
frees the regulatory system from any need to protect a carrier's
ability to generate excess revenues from passengers traveling in unregulated markets since no such funds will be neded for cross-subsidy.
I have presented the preceding sketch of a regulatory regime
for domestic and overseas transportation that makes maximum use
of competition not only for any intrinsic interest it may have as a
"pure" alternative to the proposed Aviation Act of 1975 (the proposed act), but also because its rationale and desirable features
provide a standard by which to judge the reforms proposed in the
Administration Bill. Virtually all the advantages possessed by the
proposed Act flow from its resemblance to the alternative proposed
above, that is, from the elimination of regulation. Virtually all its
defects stem either from failures to eliminate regulatory provisions
whose effects are adverse to consumer interests or from doomed attempts to devise politically acceptable alternatives to known regulatory evils. In no respect is the proposed act superior to a system
of unregulated domestic markets with antitrust enforcement and

" See

Swaine, A Proposal for the Control of Local Service Subsidies, 31 J.

AIR L. & COM. 181 (1965); G. EADS, THE LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINE EXPERIMENT
(1972); C.A.B. BUREAU OF OPERATING RIGHTS, SERVICE TO SMALL COMMUNITIES

(1972).
3 C.A.B., BUREAU OF OPERATING RIGHTS, supra note 34.
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contract subsidy. In a few important respects, it is much worse. It
also contains a few technical ambiguities worth correcting.
Procedurally, for example, the proposed act is extremely well
conceived. The proposed revisions reflect not only an excellent
understanding of the Board's present use of procedure to affect
substance but a subtle appreciation of the incentive structure of a
bureaucratic agency. Take as an instance the time limit for decision on new entry, proposed as an amendment to § 401 (c) ( 1).'
The Board has repeatedly refused to set new entry applications
for hearing, pleading the press of more important business in applying "priorities"3 For hearing or deciding whether to "expedite"
hearings on other route applications. Applications not expedited
languish at the Board for three years, after which time they are
dismissed as "stale." 8 This Catch-22 procedure is particularly effective because the failure to make a decision to expedite is arguably
not an action, and hence is extremely difficult to characterize as a
final "order" subject to judicial review." Since the Board has not set
the matter for hearing, the applicant does not get a decision; since
the Board has not refused to set it for hearing, arguably there can be
no review. The Board disposed of World Airways' 1967 application to provide transcontinental service for $79 in this way, ultimately dismissing it as stale."0
The proposed act requires that the decision not to set an application for hearing be in the form of a dismissal on the merits,
which is explicitly made a reviewable final order. "1 More importantly, the "sanction" imposed on the Board by the proposed act
for failure to dispose of an application on the merits within approximately one year is granting of the application.' For an agency which has been unable for nearly forty years to find merit in a
new trunkline application, this is truly "punishment" to fit the
mProposed Aviation Act of 1975 § 5, amending, 401(c) of the existing act.
14 C.F.R. § 399.60 (1975).
See REPORT OF THE C.A.B. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURAL REFORM
1 (1975).
31 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1006, 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1970); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1970).
40 C.A.B. Hearings, at 537-38, 565 (Testimony of William A. Hardenstine,
World Airways).
41Proposed Aviation Act of 1975 § 5, amending, § 401(c) of the existing act.
37

8

42Id.
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"crime!" More seriously, imposing action rather than inaction as
the consequence of delay is very likely to produce expedition by
an agency whose justification for continued existence is to shape
events in its industry.
The skepticism concerning the Board's motivational structure
implicit in the proposed procedure is warranted not only by the
Board's own past history of creative inaction, but by recent developments in the theory of bureaucratic behavior. It is now fairly
clear that setting up an expert agency-allowing it to control entry, prices, and, directly or indirectly, technological or managerial

innovation-and then telling the agency to do the best it can in
promoting the public interest in its area of regulation, does not free
high-minded commissioners from petty concerns of private interest, but rather encourages them to develop a utility calculus of
their own. Commentators disagree on the question of just what is
maximized in the behavior of commissioners so instructed, but they
pretty much agree that general public welfare is not a leading element.'
Of course, if one takes the view that restriction of entry cannot
be justified in the public interest and is skeptical of the Board's willingness to allow it, the proposed legislation, for all its ingenuity,
can at best only approximate the workings of an open market. At
worst, if skepticism about the Board's motivation is justified, the
legislation will simply force the Board to develop court-defensible
rationales with which to deny entry on substantive grounds. Given
the deference to agency expertise which has become a part of administrative law, such determinations, if supported by substantial
evidence in the record of a proceeding, are virtually unreviewable." Since even a finding which is "clearly erroneous" may be
supported by substantial evidence," an opponent of a finding made
by an agency careful not to be arbitrary will find reversal difficult
to accomplish. Since there will always be opponents to new entry,
and since those opponents will always produce at least some data
43

For an excellent survey of the literature on bureaucratic motivation and

behavior, see R. Noll, Government Administrative Behavior: A Multidisciplinary
Survey, Social Science Working Paper No. 62, Oct., 1974 (available from Division
of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena,

California).
"See K. DAVIs,
"41d.at 528.

ADMINISTRATVE

LAw TEXT § 29.02 (1972).
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and expert testimony to support their position, a Board inclined
to curtail entry will virtually always be able to do so.
This highlights a general problem with the proposed act. It may
correct, by explicit prohibition (as in § 12 of the new act which
amends § 412 of the Federal Aviation Act by prohibiting capacity agreements, pooling, or agreements on agents' commissions) or
by ingenious incentive design,' existing Board tendencies toward
suppressing competition. But as long as the Board's existing power
remains, and as long as it is inclined as it has been in the past,
there is no reason to expect future decisions on questions other
than those specifically addressed in the reform act to be much better than past ones. Indeed, given the history of creativity exhibited
by the General Counsel's office in the past and the time to invent
new strategems, the new bill if enacted might produce less change
than a cursory examination of its provisions would suggest.
The bill's drafters seem to have attempted to take this possibility
into account. On rates, for example, the principal strategy is simply
to reduce drastically over time the Board's discretionary authority
in this area. By and large, the rate provisions of the proposed acte7
are excellent. To the extent that they work, they will produce an
approximation of free market levels. But, again because the drafters apparently felt constrained to work within the framework of the
existing legislation, some possibility exists that the rate provisions
might not accomplish their intended purpose.
The bill retains the tariff mechanism. In oligopolistic markets,
which will continue to exist under the partially constrained entry
provisions of the proposed bill, tariffs reduce the opportunity of a
firm to increase market share by offering discounts to some of its
customers. Since announced price changes in such markets will
elicit a response from rival firms, a firm contemplating offering a
discount may, under some circumstances, tend to refrain from doing so if it expects response to be rapid. If it can offer the discount
suddenly or gradually and quietly, it may experience temporary
profit increases and an improvement in market share, some of which
it hopes to keep even after the price level has been eroded to the disI E.g., the procedural deadlines contained in the proposed Aviation Act of
1975 § 5, amending, § 401(c) of the existing act, discussed in the text at notes
42-43 supra.
" Proposed Aviation Act of 1975 § 13, amending, § 1002 of the existing act.
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counted level, as it will tend to be in the long run."' Many realworld markets do not move costlessly and instantaneously, but rather in a series of price experiments, some open and some covert.
Tariffs require that a firm announce in advance the amount and
applicability of proposed price reductions. The notice provisions
ensure that rivals will have adequate time to respond. In addition,
tariffs reduce the risk to the firm of raising prices, since the advance notice provisions ensure that a firm will be able to gauge the
response of its rivals before the increases actually go into effect.
Indeed, iterative tariff filings can be a kind of "negotiation" between rival firms." It is no accident that when railroad cartels failed to "stabilize" rates because of the common-law unenforceability of their price-fixing agreements, the carriers turned to the device of tariffs enforced by a government regulatory agency to accomplish the job."
A minor problem with the provision of proposed § 1002(d),
which allows the Board to require that fares be equal to direct operating cost, stems from the fact that certain flight segments are
operated to position equipment for another segment or as a means
of serving more than one city on a long-haul flight. If a carrier
flies from Portland to Seattle as part of a flight continuing on to
New York, it may well be efficient to permit the carrier to charge
very low fares to attract "fill-up" traffic between Portland and Seattle. The principal reason for operating the Portland-Seattle leg
is to serve Portland-New York traffic. The carrier can be relied on
not to operate flights primarily for traffic that does not cover direct operating costs, but both the carrier and the public are better
off if some traffic can be attracted to fill empty seats on a positioning leg or trip extension which would operate anyway.
A more important problem with the proposed legislation is that
its entry provisions are insufficiently liberal. While any move toward freer entry will almost certainly improve things, and while
the proposed bill greatly liberalizes restrictions on entry into new
markets over time by existing carriers, the legislation is seriously
deficient in its failure to provide a more realistic prospect of new
48Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 73 J. POL. ECON., 44-61 (1965).

" See, e.g., C.A.B. Hearings at 1155, 1225-26.
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION, esp. Ch. 5, 6 (1965).
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entry by carriers not currently in business. This has important
implications not only for new service proposals but for the prospect
of lower fares through competition.
There are three principal classes of benefits from new airline
entry:
1) provision of new capacity in markets not now served or
insufficiently served;
2) lowering of fares in existing markets as a result of increased competition; and
3) innovation, either in the form of identification of new
price/quality options, new marketing ideas to expand travel
markets (the inclusive tour is an example of this), or managerial or technical innovation to lower costs (in particular,
indirect costs of management and operation).
The proposed legislation should certainly help bring about new
service in city-pair markets not now receiving nonstop service. Section 6(b) of the proposed act amends § 401 of the existing act to
provide for issuance of a certificate without reference to public
interest, convenience, and necessity to any fit, willing, and able applicant offering to provide nonstop service in a market not receiving such service from a certificated carrier. This should certainly have the effect of encouraging existing carriers to offer at
least five roundtrips per week" in any market which they are authorized to serve nonstop and which they think can support such
service over the long run. Indeed, such service might be offered
prematurely to prevent a new carrier from gaining a certificate toehold which could be used as the basis for additional new service
under the expansion provisions contained in § 9 of the proposed
act. The possibility of route expansion by another certificated carrier should also provide incentives for increased service in markets
now receiving some, but insufficient, nonstop service. And the removal of certificate restrictions contained in § 9 of the proposed
act should provide still more potential nonstop authority.
There is one interesting problem for would-be new entrants,
however. Since the bill is ambiguous with respect to the point in
time at which the existence of service is to be determined for the
51The proposed Aviation Act of 1975

§ 9 containing the definition of "sched-

uled service", adding S 401(r) to the existing act.
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purposes of certificating a new carrier, even this limited provision
for new entry could be circumvented by the Board if it decided
that service initiated after application by the new carrier but before
completion of a hearing on its fitness, willingness, and ability negated the applicability of § 6(b) of the proposed act. Under such
an interpretation, an existing carrier could squelch a new entrant
simply by initiating service after the new application was filed,
an outcome which should make new applications very unrewarding, and hence rare. The likelihood of such an interpretation by
the Board is speculation, but a skeptical observer would not be reassured by the restrictive construction the Board recently put on
§ 401(d) (3) in dismissing World Airways' application for transcontinental low-fare service authority."
Whether the legislation will bring about lower fares in
existing markets depends upon the predicted nature of new
entry under the expansion"' and certificate reorganization"' provisions. These provisions limit most new entry to existing trunklines
and local service carriers who are members of the certificated
"club." It is entirely possible that years of accommodation to the
regulated environment and mutual recognition of interdependence
have produced a situation in which entry would occur largely without new price competition, much as it does now when the Board
adds a certificated carrier to a market. Whether adding a few intrastate carriers (which now operate in rate-regulated environments)
to the list of eligible competitors or changing from introducing
new competitors into a market one at a time to the simultaneous
multiple eligibility made possible by the bill would replace existing
capacity competition with aggressive fare competition is difficult to
predict. If vigorous fare competition followed from route expansion, many of the benefits of free competition would have been
achieved by the proposed legislation.
There is historical cause for concern that liberalized fare competition without free entry by new firms will not produce competitive price and output conditions. The major examples-California,
Texas, New York-San Juan transcontinental coach service-of vig"C.A.B. Order No. 76-1-88 (Jan. 23, 1976).
Proposed Aviation Act of 1975 § 9.
11d. at S 6(c), amending, § 401(e)(1) of the existing act, and S 9, adding,
§ 401(o)(1) to the existing act.
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orous fare competition and new price/quality options have occurred when, due to lack of entry controls or a regulatory agency receptive to entry, new firms not already operating in the Board-controlled environment have entered the market. Indeed, in the California and Puerto Rico examples, statutory authority for fare regulation existed and was occasionally exercised.' This suggests the
seemingly paradoxical possibililty that ease of entry is more important as a factor in fare competition than rate freedom. If this
is true, it may be because air transportation is a relatively nonproduct-differentiated service, so that price competition is the principal means available to a new entrant trying to establish itself
in the marketplace. Lack of interdependencies with existing firms
operating in other markets may also be a factor. And an agency
faced with repeated low-fare proposals by applicants may find it
difficult to refuse new entry (although the Board's treatment of the
large irregular air carriers and World Airways suggests caution in
accepting the last explanation).
This brings us to the last benefit to be achieved from freer entry, namely increased management innovation. In this respect, we
must take seriously the possibility that new firms not now adapted
to the regulatory environment may be the single most important
source of new managerial and marketing ideas. Since aircraft operating costs are limited by technology and tend to be relatively similar from carrier to carrier operating the same type, the principal
opportunities for innovation available are probably in the areas of
control of direct labor costs, indirect costs and imaginative marketing. PSA's and Southwest's operating efficiency have often been noted" and are difficult to explain in terms unrelated to their operational specialization due to lack of a prior regulated history. 7 Many
of the most significant marketing innovations of the postwar erathe Laker Airways Skytrain proposal, Southwest Airlines' peak/offpeak price structure, transcontinental coach service, and Trans Ca5 For an example in California, see Levine, supra note 2 at 1430, n.60. In the
New York-San Juan market, of course, the CAB has full regulatory jurisdiction
over rates.
' See, e.g., C.A.B. Hearings at 480 (Testimony of W. A. Jordan), 1244 (Testimony of M. Lamar Muse).
57 Not for lack of effort along those lines by CAB-certificated carriers. See, e.g.,
Levine, supra note 2 at 1442-43; C.A.B. Hearings, 587-600 (Testimony of James
L. Mitchell, Continental Airlines).
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ribbean Airways' very-high-density thrift service-have been introduced by "outsiders" trying to break into a market. While it is possible that the existing regulated firms who would be the principal
source of new entry under the proposed act would find themselves
forced to innovate by increased competition among themselves, it
does seem odd and unfortunate that the proposed act provides far
more flexible pricing freedom than entry freedom. If the drafters felt
the political environment permitted them to choose only one degree
of freedom in deregulating air transportation, there is reason to blieve that they should have focused their primary efforts on entry
by completely new carriers.
Assuming the Board must be retained in the form contemplated
by the proposed act, the antitrust provisions of §§ 11-13"8 are
a major improvement over the present arrangements, although
they do not involve quite as comprehensive an overhaul as I proposed earlier in this article." The princpal antitrust defect
of the proposed act lies in its adoption of the liberalized Clayton
Act standards adopted for banks in the 1966 Banking Act amendments.' As proposed, this would permit the Board to approve a
consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition:
[W]hose effect in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, or
which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade...
[if] the Board finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transactionare outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the transportation convenience and needs of the community or communities to be served, and unless it finds that such transportation
convenience and needs may not be satisfied by any less anticompetitive alternative (emphasis added)."
While such flexibility may be desirable in the abstract, its inclusion here represents another example of a general tendency, al51 Proposed Aviation Act of 1975

§

11-13, amending, §§ 408, 412, and 414

of the existing act.
11 See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.

so 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970).
"lProposed Aviation Act of 1975 § 11(b) (2), amending, § 408(b) of the existing act.
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ready noted, "2 of this legislation to correct specific past problems in
the Board's administration of the Federal Aviation Act while leaving the Board with the power to recreate an anticompetitive regime through specific decisions. Since the Board has already interpreted the existing act in more anticompetitive terms than most
scholars think is required by its language (for example, the act
did not require the Board to refuse all new trunkline entry or to
eliminate proposed new competition by delay), it is difficult to see
why the Board should be given any more opportunity than absolutely necessary to interpret and administer the new statute in a
manner contrary to its intent.
An additional minor antitrust problem arises from the exemption of agreements allocating landing "slots" among carriers operating into high traffic airports from the prohibitions of pooling
or capacity agreements contained in the proposed amendments to
§ 412 of the existing act." Since these agreements can easily be
used as a vehicle for tacit divisions of markets at the high traffic
airports and as quids pro quo for reductions of competition elsewhere, such agreements could only be justified if there were no
available alternatives. A competitive alternative more efficient
than intercarrier agreements is readily available, so this exemption
should be deleted. The alternative is competitive bidding for "slots"
at congested airports, as has been suggested by numerous commentators. Absent a kind of collusion which would be clearly illegal
under the antitrust laws, such bidding should efficiently allocate
the existing facilities and generate revenues for expansion. Outlawing the "slot" agreements would encourage airport authorities to
adopt this approach. There is no reason to give special treatment to
a less desirable solution.
Relaxation of the equipment restrictions on Part 298 operators
(commuter carriers) is a welcome change.' As with the antitrust exemption, however, there is no special reason to expect the
62

See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.

'Proposed Aviation Act of 1975 § 12(c).
"4 Levine, Landing Fees and the Airport Congestion Problem, 12 J. LAw &
ECON. 79 (1969). See also R. ECKERT, AIRPORT AND CONGESTION: A PROBLEM

(1972).
Proposed Aviation Act of 1975 § 6(b), amending, S 401(d) of the existing
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Board to further relax the restriction, as the proposed act allows if
circumstances seem to warrant it. Of course, as long as there is
to be entry limitation, there must be some limit on the Part 298
exemption, but this is another example of possible less-than-efficient market organization resulting from the decision not to propose "pure" deregulation.
The route transfer provisions of § 7 of the proposed legislation
offer the principal significant possibility for entry by a new firm.
As such, its liberalized standard limiting the Board's approval
authority to finding the transferee fit, willing and able is a welcome
amendment. If the liberalized competition rules and rate freedom
do not have the desired effects, however, this provision will require
any prospective entrant to pay an existing certificate holder for
any market power it possesses by virtue of holding a certificate.
This will tend to capitalize and make permanent any anticompetitive effects remaining in the system. Of course, to the
extent that the new holder is more efficient or more innovative
than the old, benefits may be made available to the public. It is a
peculiarity of regulation that it creates value in a firm beyond its
asset or going-concern value. In a competitive or properly regulated (perhaps not possible) environment, a license to operate
should be worth no more than the legal fees entailed in getting
one. This fact might help in any effort to monitor the success of
any statutory changes adopted. The extent to which a change reduces the value of CAB certificates will be a partial surrogate
measure for the amount of monopoly power a new regulatory
scheme has destroyed."'
Two longstanding issues involving the Board-postal contracting and local service subsidy-are also addressed by the proposed
legislation. The postal contracting issue was last addressed in the
debate over the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970. At that time,
the Postal Service and the Administration failed in their efforts to
remove CAB protection of carriers from the airmail procurement
process."' The proposed act's attempt ' to authorize contracting
61 Of course, the same effect might be observed if the changes simply made the
industry less efficient, but this would presumably be accompanied by rising prices

and other changes which would enable the analyst to distinguish the two situations.
07 See Levine, supra note 28 for a history and analysis of these efforts.
"Proposed

Aviation Act of 1975 § 15, amending, 39 U.S.C. § 5402(a) (1970).
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deserves support. In view of the likely intensity of carrier opposition, it is understandable that the proposed bill creates a
hierarchy of eligibility for such contracts, starting with carriers certificated between the points involved, then other certificated carriers, and finally any other air carriers. But certificated carrier opposition to this entire bill is likely to be so strong that any coalition
powerful enough to overcome their opposition at all may well be
strong enough to pass it in a form which does not limit airmail
contract eligibility. This would increase the number of available
bidders for any contract, but without eliminating the normal
economic advantage of a carrier already providing service in
combination equipment over a route proposed for mail contracting.
The increased number of bidders should ensure procurement at
the lowest possible cost to the Postal Service.
The outlines of local service subsidy reform have been articulated and the general principles agreed upon in two academic studies7 and two CAB studies"0 and the outline was the subject of a
CAB proposal to the Senate Aviation Subcommittee."' All these
efforts agreed that a low-bid competitive subsidy program was
feasible and desirable. There seems to be little reason to require a
new study, and the proposed bill should include authorization for
such a program.
A technical ambiguity in the language of the bill as introduced
into the Congress in October 1975 ought to be resolved. Section
6(c) of the bill states that the Board should reissue certificates as
an unduplicated list of city pairs that each certified carrier is
authorized to serve. Section 9, in its commendable attempt to eliminate artificial restrictions on the service that carriers can provide
in certificated markets, states that on or after January 1, 1981,
each air carrier engaged in air transportation may engage in nonstop scheduled air transportation between any United States points
named in its certificates on January 1, 1975. This would be very
much broader authority than that conferred by authorizing transportation between named city pairs and, indeed, for a carrier serving many different points would be broader authority than that
00
Swaine,
70

G. EAns, supra note 34.
C.A.B. BUREAU OF OPERATING RIGHTS, supra note 34;
at 333.
"' REGULATORY REFORM at 90-91.
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contained in the route expansion provisions of the bill. While I certainly would have no objection to conferring the broader authority,
I doubt that such a result was intended. In any event, the ambiguity
should be resolved.
While the proposed act falls well short of the degree of deregulation that could be justified by the present state of knowledge concerning air transport regulation, it is a major step in the right direction and should be supported. The degree to which it will fall short
of the benefits that could be obtained from more comprehensive deregulation depends largely on the performance of existing carriers
operating in a relatively free rate-setting regime with increasing,
but not total, freedom of entry. If such carriers can exhibit fully
competitive behavior and greatly increased levels of managerial
and operational innovation, the benefits to the public could be very
great indeed. One must wonder, however, whether managements
adapted to survival in a quasi-cartelized environment demanding
great sophistication in dealing with a government agency are likely
to be flexible enough (or will be forced to be flexible enough) to
behave like innovating competitors. If the bill passes, time will
tell.
This brings up the final and perhaps most important problem.
What chance is there that this bill, or any bill reasonably like it in
concept, will pass? There is little evidence that the relevant committees of the Congress are at all sympathetic to deregulation.
When the Postal Service succeeded in getting a bill providing for
a more competitive environment for a relatively small proportion
of airline traffic" (mail accounted for less than five percent of industry revenues in 1970) to the floor of the House by bypassing
the Commerce Committee (which was opposed), the proposal was
badly beaten."3 If postal contracting for airmail was unable to survive in an environment in which reducing postal costs was politically important, how well will much broader deregulation do on its
own? Whatever the defects of the present system, it provides relative security for airline managements.' They have been well organized politically since 1938, and the cohesion created by the regu12Mail

accounted for less than five percent of industry revenues in 1970.

7' Levine, supra note 28.
4
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latory regime which has limited their numbers makes them even
more formidable today. Carrier testimony in the 1975 hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and
Procedures suggests that the certificated airlines understand very
well how much is at stake. ' Only the sheer magnitude of the costs
of regulation to the public and growing public awareness of those
costs militates politically in favor of passage. I do not think that
they will be enough.
An interesting question of political strategy is raised by these
grim prospects. If one thought that by ignoring some of what we
know could be achieved by total deregulation, a bill could be enacted, one might well be prepared to make the compromises contained in the proposed bill. But if the congressional climate (especially in the relevant committees) is hostile to deregulation,
should not a bill designed to maximize consumer benefits be introduced in an effort to create pressure for some limited kind of reform? Such a bill would have the outline suggested in the earlier
part of this article and would leave a lot of room for watering
down. Or would it simply be so incredible to the Congress (ironically, considering its congruence with the current state of scholarly
knowledge) as to damage even further the prospects for a consumer-oriented regulatory scheme? I leave the answers to such
delicate problems of Congressional politics to those more expert in
dealing with them.

75 C.A.B. Hearings, certificated carrier testimony passim. See, e.g., id. at 512-23,
629-37.

